Posts Tagged ‘ drug trafficking

The Arrests of woot and reid

On April 9 2012, a statement of facts was filed at the Eastern District of Virginia Court after a plea bargain was reached regarding a charge of conspiracy to import an analogue controlled substance. Justin Steven Scroggins, also known as woot from the online drug discussion forum euphoricknowledge.com, pled guilty to the charge. The statement of facts was in large part similar to the indictment posted previously, but also contains additional detail of his arrest.

On April 10, 2012, Scroggins was arrested in Jacksonville, Florida. He was given his legal rights and elected to waive them in writing. Scroggins admitted that he had set up his own website, www.euphoricknowledge.com, in August 2011 to compete with another drug website on which he had previously sold synthetic drugs. Scroggins not only marketed drugs on his website, but also sold advertising space on the site for $200 to $400 per month. In November 2011, Scroggins began using the name Micro Nutrient Supply (MNS) to market synthetic cannabinoids from the AM and JWH series of compounds. He then expanded his market to include 5-MeO-MiPT, 5-MeO-DALT, A-PVP, MXE, 4-EMC, 4-MEC, and etizolam. Scroggins admitted to importing his drugs into the United States from three different laboratories in China. Scroggins stated that he would label his blends and other products “not for human consumption” but he admitted “I know what it is … people buy this stuff to get high.”

Scroggins admitted to special agents that he had placed an order for A-PVP, pentylone, pentedrone, 4-MEC and other drugs from reidtang, one of the contacts at a Chinese lab, through CD#1 in Virginia on April 5, 2012. He stated that he wanted to place the order through CD#1 because the drug bans were much less stringent in Virginia than in Florida. Scroggins and CD#1 had both ordered and received analogue drugs from reidtang prior to the April order.

In a consent search of the defendant’s residence, agents recovered three plastic bags containing 4-MEC and UR-144, which had been placed in the toilet for disposal but did not go down the drain. The plastic bag containing the drugs was submitted to the Department of Homeland Security US Customs and Border Protection Laboratory. The lab determined that there was 24.24 grams of 4-MEC and UR-144 in a small bag, 120.36 grams of 4-MEC in a large bag, and plant material which contained 45.64 grams of 4-MEC.

Further, agents recovered mixing jars, rubber gloves, a grinder, USPS packing/mailing boxes and envelopes, packaging materials, tobacco flavorings, a desktop computer, a USB drive and a Sprint cell phone. In addition, $1636 in US currency was recovered.

On September 5 2012, the contact at the Chinese lab named in the statement of facts “reidtang” was allegedly arrested as well. This appears to be a coordinated effort between US and Chinese authorities.

our company no long existed since reid has been arrested by the china GOV.
he was arrested at 5th,SEP,and still haven’t been able to release so far,all the stocks of our chems and money have been confiscated by the police.
we’re realy sorry for this happened,we never scammed any of the customers,but,we have no money to compensate for your loss……….
the situation here seems quite not optimistic here,the GOV is seaching for RCs source……
best regards,

The Fall of Euphoric Knowledge

On April 9 2012, an affidavit was filed at the Eastern District of Virginia Court describing an offense of conspiracy to import an analogue controlled substance. The affidavit was submitted in support for an arrest warrant for Justin Steven Scroggins, also known as woot who ran the online drug discussion forum Euphoric Knowledge. Selected excepts follow, edited for clarity.

Since early February 2012, I have been investigating a loosely affiliated organization of individuals throughout the United States that are involved in the large scale importation of synthetic drugs from laboratories in China into the United States and the subsequent nationwide distribution of those drugs. Through the course of the investigation, I have identified Justin Steven Scroggins, aka “Woot”, aka “Dirk McDiggler” as an individual involved in these activities. Scroggins was initially identified by a cooperating defendant (CD#1) in this investigation.

Through the review of recorded telephone conversations, internet chats, and video teleconferencing activities, I have become acutely aware of Scroggins and his drug trafficking activities. On an almost daily basis since March 16, 2012, Scroggins has been observed discussing his use, importation and distribution of various controlled substances including, but not limited to: cocaine, marijuana, and various synthetic drugs covered under the Federal Analogue Act. Scroggins has been observed discussing methods by which he receives payment for his drug trafficking activities, disguises his income, and launders the proceeds. Scroggins has also discussed, on several occasions, planning to launder money for a profit for vendors on his website euphoricknowledge.com.

I reviewed a video recording taken April 5, 2012 in which Scroggins, CD#1, and a third individual “reidtang” conducted a recorded three-way videoconference. The purpose of this teleconference was for Scroggins to discuss importing several synthetic drugs from reidtang’s laboratory in China into the United States via CD#1. Scroggins expressed his intent to sent approximately $5000 via express mail to CD#1 so that CD#1 could purchase the drugs from reidtang on Scroggins’ behalf. Scroggins stated that he wished for CD#1 to purchase the following on his behalf:

1 kilogram of 4-MEC
500 grams of A-PVP
250 grams of pentylone
250 grams of pentedrone
25 grams of D2PM
25 grams of 4-MBC
25 grams of A-PBP

(These substances are analogues of scheduled controlled substances banned by federal law. As they are chemically similar in structure and have the same basic physiological effects as the controlled substances, these substances are banned under 21 U.S.C. Section 813, as Schedule I controlled substances.)

On the video recording Scroggins stated that he intentionally wished to conduct the transaction in this fashion saying “I don’t wanna get any of that shit here because I don’t wanna have any issues goin’ to fuckin’ jail over it.” Scroggins also added that “I’m pretty sure they went through one of my packages, they didn’t open the packages, but they opened the documentation for it, they were reading the slips.” Scroggins also commented on other difficulties with increasingly stringent synthetic drug bans in Florida.

In addition to the recorded video teleconferencing, Scroggins, CD#1, and reidtang were conducting a simultaneous text chat. During this text chat, Scroggins told reidtang “so total of about $6000, I will send money to CD#1, he can bankwire no issues :) ” to which reidtang responded “k good”. Reidtang then informed Scroggins he has methoxetamine for sale. Scroggins responded “nice as long as it is good quality, rcsupplier sent me a batch of fucking white crap. I can maybe snort 100mg, small effect, haha and it makes my throat feel scratchy. Feels like I’ve been snorting a razor.” Scroggins subsequently sent CD#1 an internet chat message with the tracking number for the currency being mailed to CD#1.

On the morning of April 7, 2012, I along with another member of the investigative team intercepted the package of US currency being shipped to CD#1 from Scroggins. The package was a letter size US Postal Service Express Mail envelope. The package was seized and opened with the consent of CD#1. Inside this envelope as a sealed US Postal Service Priority Mail envelope which contained a sealed white plastic envelope, which in turn contained a sealed manila envelope, which contained a sealed brown paper envelope, which finally contained $4600 US currency. The tracking number on this package was the same tracking number provided the previous day by Scroggins.

Based on the previous, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that Scroggins aka w00t and others, some of whom are not yet known or fully identified, have committed the offense described above.

A short message was posted on the website euphoricknowledge.com confirming these events.

Dear users of Euphoric Knowledge,

It is in this time of great duress we must inform you about what has been going on, and what the current site admins have been trying to cover up.

Woot has indeed been arrested and is in custody. We have little faith that he will not roll on us. Here is proof of his arrest

(link to affidavit)

As you can see, woot has been in custody since April 10. The DEA has sealed the case as an “ongoing investigation” which means EK is likely compromised beyond salvation. Resu and MrMike are not to be trusted, as they have been trying to cover up these allegations, even going so far as to say he would post from woot’s account to reassure everyone. Their nonchalant attitude here seems to indicate his own LEO involvement, or at least a blatant disregard for the member’s safety by covering up this event. They specifically requested the staff not tell anyone what had happened.

This is coming from the entire moderation staff. We have convened long and hard about this. Following this post we will likely be banned.

We extend a hand of friendship to you members to reconvene with us at

rcbay.org

It is a nonprofit site. Vendors do not pay to be sponsored. The domain is hosted in russia, out of the USA’s jurisdiction.

In this time of great strife, we must remember to be strong. We are still a community.
We advise you to take measures to protect yourselves. Delete incrimination posts, etc

Godspeed,
The EK Moderation team

The site mentioned as a euphoricknowledge.com replacement, rcbay.org, does not currently appear to be operational.

Missing Kenyan Cocaine Arrives in England

Summary

[Kenyan] Attorney General Wako offers inconsistent, unconvincing explanations of why more than one ton of cocaine held by the Government of Kenya for over a year cannot yet be destroyed. [American Ambassador Wiliam Bellamy] and [British High Commissioner Adam Wood] agreed with the [British Government] to give the [Government of Kenya] another 3 weeks to develop a credible plan before going public with [their] dissatisfaction. Although many have called for Wako’s resignation in recent months, [Kenyan] President Kibaki does not have the constitutional authority to remove the Attorney General from office.

Wako explained that due to a “bad law” (specifically, section 74(a) of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Control Act), the [Government of Kenya] could not destroy the drug stockpile until it had been exhibited to, and sampled in the presence of, all of the defendants in the case. This has already occurred for six defendants currently standing trial in Nairobi. Another key defendant, however, has just been convicted on drug charges in the Netherlands. While the Netherlands has agreed to Kenya’s request for extradition, the defendant had appealed to the Netherlands high court. The High Court is expected to decide within the next two or three weeks whether the defendant can be extradited.

Wako said once the defendant is extradited, he will confront the evidence (the stockpile) and, after that, the stockpile can be disposed of. Wako was vague on how long this process might take. If, on the other hand, the Dutch High Court ruled against extradition, there would be no need to retain the stockpile.

[British High Commissioner Adam] Wood and I both pressed for the [Government of Kenya] to at least invite in outside experts to test, measure and seal the stockpile. This could be done immediately, and without prejudice as to how and when the stockpile was eventually disposed of. Such verification was needed, we argued, to put to rest worries that the stockpile had been tampered with and possibly trafficked. [British High Commissioner Adam] Wood explained how, with shipments of cocaine showing up in London on incoming Kenya Airways flights, [the British government's] patience was growing thin. I added that the [Government of Kenya] would soon have a serious credibility problem if it could not show that the stockpile was intact and being handled in accordance with best international practices.

Unfortunately, Wako explained, it would not be a good idea to test, measure or seal the stockpile. It would undermine the prosecution’s case since it would allow the defense to argue that the State did not have confidence in its own evidence. Wood and I dismissed this argument as lacking any credibility. When pressed about whether retention of the entire stockpile was necessary throughout the trial, Wako and Tobiko were evasive. Eventually, they admitted that the stockpile could be disposed of once the prosecution rested its case.

Comment

The bottom line is that the Kenyan authorities have been sitting on more than a ton of cocaine for more than a year, at least four consignments of cocaine have reached the U.K. from Kenya in that period, and no one in the [Government of Kenya] is able or willing to assert that the stockpile is intact and that a credible plan exists for measuring and disposing of it. It is significant that Police Commissioner Ali, under whose authority the cocaine is supposedly safeguarded, urged us prior to the Wako meeting to press the Attorney General hard for verification as soon as possible. Ali wants to wash his hands of the mess; for some reason, Wako does not.

[American Ambassador Wiliam Bellamy and British High Commissioner Adam Wood] have heard repeated complaints from respected figures in and out of the [Government of Kenya] (including Anti-Corruption Chief Justice Ringera and World Bank Director Colin Bruce) that Wako is the main obstacle to successful prosecutions of any kind in Kenya. Whether he is profiting in some way from the drug trade, protecting others who are involved in it, or is working from some other motive, we cannot tell. He may feel a degree of immunity since the constitution does not allow the President or any other authority to remove him from office.

Attorney General Wako is also notable for his involvement in the Goldenberg scandal, which some estimate to have cost Kenya more than 10% of its annual gross domestic product.

From Cable Reference ID 06NAIROBI839, 2006-02-24 , Classification CONFIDENTIAL, Origin Embassy Nairobi

Guinean Cocaine Seizure Goes Down in Flames


DATE: 2008-03-06 14:02:00
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
ORIGIN: Embassy Conakry

SUBJECT: SEIZED DRUGS FINALLY INCINERATED…OR WERE THEY?

SUMMARY: On April 11, 2008, Guinean police seized a shipment of cocaine, exact quantity unknown, and detained six suspects believed to be of Latin American origin. All [US government] requests for additional information regarding the details of the seizure or the suspects have gone unanswered. The [diplomatic] mission focused its efforts to ensure the destruction of the drugs and the result of these efforts proves that corrupt elements of the government are in full control. Exactly one month after the seizure, [the US] Ambassador and [members of the American Regional Security Office] attended the alleged incineration of 390 kilos of cocaine. The incineration was a farce that fooled no one and highlighted the possible complicity of the Guinean Minister of Interior and Security and high-level police officials.

A Long-Anticipated Event

Over a ten-day period, the [US diplomatic mission] in collaboration with the British Ambassador made several unsuccessful attempts to discuss the transparent destruction of the drugs. Finally, on May 2, 2008, the US and UK Ambassadors met with the [Guinean] Minister of Interior and Security and were given well-rehearsed assurances of the [Government of Guinea]‘s commitment to combating drug trafficking and an invitation to view the drugs destruction. The incineration, initially planned for May 7 and rescheduled for May 9, finally took place on May 10, 2008.

Excuses, Excuses, Excuses

After consultations with DEA Paris, [the US] Ambassador requested permission to take a random sample of the cocaine for testing purposes. Controller General Diane automatically agreed, causing an immediate backlash from Director General Bangoura and [the anti-narcotics bureau] Director Mara. Director General Bangoura found several excuses, to include concern over [our] health and safety. He also explained that the cocaine had been treated with chemicals, rendering it useless. Director General Bangoura, in his usual arrogant and condescending fashion, refused to address the [US] Ambassador, claiming that this was not a matter of diplomacy, but police business. [Anti-narcotics bureau] Director Mara’s enraged response included direct accusations of infringement upon Guinean sovereignty. This heated exchange took place in a very public setting and was documented by the private press.

Theatrical Production

Upon the arrival of Minister of Interior and Security Keita and Minister of Justice Paulette Kourouma, the [US] Ambassador’s request for a random sample of the cocaine was quickly denied. The pile was immediately doused with gasoline and ceremoniously lit on fire by the Minister of Justice. The President of the National Committee Against Drug Trafficking was very dramatic in announcing the destruction of 160 kilos of marijuana, 390 kilos of cocaine and 43 boxes of pharmaceutical products (later explained to be expired ibuprofen). The destroyed narcotics were reportedly valued at 6.5 million dollars.

After the incineration, [the American Regional Security Office] was permitted to take a sample from a pre-designated package of cocaine. The [the anti-narcotics bureau] Deputy Director, the only individual that was allowed to get near the pile of narcotics, handpicked the package. On May 6, 2008, the [American Regional Security Office] [Foreign Service National] Investigator received a call from [name removed], who in the past weeks has provided [the Regional Security Office] with sensitive information on the drug seizure. [name removed] stated that the [Government of Guinea] planned to burn packages of flour. [The American Regional Security Office] is unable to prove that the cocaine was in fact substituted with flour; however, the [Government of Guinea]‘s lack of cooperation and vehement rejection to a request for random sampling raises troubling questions about the [Government of Guinea]‘s interest in transparency. And as the [US] Ambassador’s driver very keenly observed, “I know the smell of burning marijuana, and I didn’t smell anything.” The entire event was a theatrical production.

Thankfully the US Ambassador’s driver was there to recognize the smell of burning marijuana, or else the seizure may have remained a mystery to this day.

The event was a real eye-opener and a facade. The incineration was a ridiculous attempt by the [Government of Guinea] to prove that a law enforcement campaign against narcotics exists. If anything was proven, it was that the traffickers’ influence has reached the highest levels of the government. There is an obvious fracture within the security forces, and only a handful of officials appear to be fighting to carry out legitimate duties. The clear reluctance and open animosity displayed by all the senior Ministry of Interior and Security (MIS) officials and the diffident response of the Ministers to the [US] Ambassador’s request suggest complicity at the highest levels of the Ministry. The silver-lining of the event is that the heated debate and ridiculous protestation by MIS to the Ambassador’s request for a random sampling were witnessed and recorded by elements of the Guinean media (state-owned and independent).

From Cable Reference ID 08CONAKRY184, 2008-03-06 14:02:00, Classification SECRET, Origin Embassy Conakry.

Drug Trafficking in Mozambique

A cable was sent in November of 2009 from the US Embassy in Maputo detailing the increasing problems Mozambique was experiencing with drug trafficking. The diplomat described how “porous borders, lack of law enforcement resources, and rampant corruption allow drug traffickers to freely transit the country”.

Air Routes

2. (S) The primary route for cocaine is by air to Maputo from Brazil via Johannesburg, Lisbon or Luanda. On arrival passengers and baggage do not pass through immigration and customs, which allows them to avoid the improved security at the airports of origin. Drugs (mostly cocaine) are smuggled overland to South Africa for local South African consumption or onward to Europe. Cocaine is often smuggled by mules and/or in suitcases with hidden compartments. The drug traffickers routinely bribe Mozambique police, immigration and customs officials in order to get the drugs into the country. The decrease in drug related arrests at Maputo International Airport is not attributable to improved interdiction efforts but rather increased police and customs involvement in drug smuggling. A high level law enforcement official admits most police drug seizures are not reported to his office because traffickers and police make on-the-spot arrangements to allow the drugs to continue to flow. Police and customs officials routinely detain drug smugglers and are then bribed to release the smugglers and the drugs are confiscated and resold. Domingos Tivane, the Director of Customs, is directly involved in facilitating drug shipments. Tivane has amassed a personal fortune in excess of a million dollars, to include numerous investments around Mozambique.

Sea Routes

3. (S) Transport by sea is the preferred route for hashish, mandrax, and heroin shipments, often involving large quantities. Drugs come from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. They are then loaded onto a vessel that sails to Dar Es-Salam, Tanzania, or Mombasa, Kenya. Drugs are often concealed in containers with legitimate goods and are often offloaded and sent via land to Mozambique. Alternatively, the vessel offloads its cargo in the Ports of Maputo, Beira and especially Nacala. Drugs are then smuggled overland to South Africa or onward via air, to the U.S. and Europe.

“Mandrax” here refers to a brand name of methaqualone, commonly known as Quaaludes in North America. No longer legally produced, it is clandestinely manufactured for the illegal drug market in many African and South Asian countries. Methaqualone is a common drug of abuse in low-income segments of South African society, where it is mixed with cannabis (“dagga”) and typically smoked in a bottle neck pipe.

Two Main Drug Trafficking Networks

4. (S) There are two large drug trafficking networks that operate in Mozambique. Both of these networks have ties to South East Asia. Mohamed Bashir Suleiman (MBS) is the head of a well financed organized crime and money laundering network centered on the family owned and managed business conglomerate Grupo MBS. Suleiman uses Grupo MBS and proxies like Rassul Trading, run by Ghulam Rassul, and Niza Group, owned by the Ayoub family, to smuggle drugs from Pakistan via Dubai in containers carrying televisions, electrical equipment, cooking oil and automobiles. The Suleiman family has connections in South Africa, Somalia, Pakistan, Latin America and Portugal, and maintains a complex structure of businesses with a wide variety of commercial activities that serve as a cover for a multitude of illegal activities. Suleiman has a close relationship with former President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano and current President Armando Guebuza, and enjoys ties to senior level Mozambican officials, including the Director of Customs, Tivane. Grupo MBS and the Suleiman family reportedly have connections in the Ibrahim Dawood international drug syndicate.

5. (S) Ghulam Rassul Moti is a Mozambique based ethnic South Asian narcotics trafficker who has smuggled hashish and heroin in the Nampula province of Northern Mozambique since at least 1993. He has been linked to several prominent international narcotics traffickers and uses these relationships and his political influence to avoid customs and police inspections at the seaports and borders. Moti owns Rassul Trading Co. and Grupo ARJ which are major narcotics importers in Nacala, and suspected in the trafficking of persons, mainly Pakistanis. Post is also seeing increased cooperation between West and East African based narcotics networks with Mozambique drug networks. The main drug organizations are rumored to support extremist Islamist elements in Mozambique.

Corruption of Senior Level Government Officials

6. (S) A porous border, lack of resources for law enforcement as well as endemic corruption among Mozambique’s senior level officials leads to a situation where drug traffickers are able to freely transit the country. Mid-level Mozambican officials are afraid to go after people involved in the major drug networks because they know they have connections to senior level government officials. Senior members of the ruling FRELIMO party are seeking to hide the level of corruption from the press, the electorate and the international donor community. As a high level law enforcement official also said recently in private, ‘Some fish are too big to catch.’

From Cable Reference ID 09MAPUTO1291, 2009-11-16 07:07, Classification SECRET, Origin Embassy Maputo.