rational exploration of the underground

DATE: 2008-03-06 14:02:00
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
ORIGIN: Embassy Conakry

SUBJECT: SEIZED DRUGS FINALLY INCINERATED…OR WERE THEY?

SUMMARY: On April 11, 2008, Guinean police seized a shipment of cocaine, exact quantity unknown, and detained six suspects believed to be of Latin American origin. All [US government] requests for additional information regarding the details of the seizure or the suspects have gone unanswered. The [diplomatic] mission focused its efforts to ensure the destruction of the drugs and the result of these efforts proves that corrupt elements of the government are in full control. Exactly one month after the seizure, [the US] Ambassador and [members of the American Regional Security Office] attended the alleged incineration of 390 kilos of cocaine. The incineration was a farce that fooled no one and highlighted the possible complicity of the Guinean Minister of Interior and Security and high-level police officials.

A Long-Anticipated Event

Over a ten-day period, the [US diplomatic mission] in collaboration with the British Ambassador made several unsuccessful attempts to discuss the transparent destruction of the drugs. Finally, on May 2, 2008, the US and UK Ambassadors met with the [Guinean] Minister of Interior and Security and were given well-rehearsed assurances of the [Government of Guinea]‘s commitment to combating drug trafficking and an invitation to view the drugs destruction. The incineration, initially planned for May 7 and rescheduled for May 9, finally took place on May 10, 2008.

Excuses, Excuses, Excuses

After consultations with DEA Paris, [the US] Ambassador requested permission to take a random sample of the cocaine for testing purposes. Controller General Diane automatically agreed, causing an immediate backlash from Director General Bangoura and [the anti-narcotics bureau] Director Mara. Director General Bangoura found several excuses, to include concern over [our] health and safety. He also explained that the cocaine had been treated with chemicals, rendering it useless. Director General Bangoura, in his usual arrogant and condescending fashion, refused to address the [US] Ambassador, claiming that this was not a matter of diplomacy, but police business. [Anti-narcotics bureau] Director Mara’s enraged response included direct accusations of infringement upon Guinean sovereignty. This heated exchange took place in a very public setting and was documented by the private press.

Theatrical Production

Upon the arrival of Minister of Interior and Security Keita and Minister of Justice Paulette Kourouma, the [US] Ambassador’s request for a random sample of the cocaine was quickly denied. The pile was immediately doused with gasoline and ceremoniously lit on fire by the Minister of Justice. The President of the National Committee Against Drug Trafficking was very dramatic in announcing the destruction of 160 kilos of marijuana, 390 kilos of cocaine and 43 boxes of pharmaceutical products (later explained to be expired ibuprofen). The destroyed narcotics were reportedly valued at 6.5 million dollars.

After the incineration, [the American Regional Security Office] was permitted to take a sample from a pre-designated package of cocaine. The [the anti-narcotics bureau] Deputy Director, the only individual that was allowed to get near the pile of narcotics, handpicked the package. On May 6, 2008, the [American Regional Security Office] [Foreign Service National] Investigator received a call from [name removed], who in the past weeks has provided [the Regional Security Office] with sensitive information on the drug seizure. [name removed] stated that the [Government of Guinea] planned to burn packages of flour. [The American Regional Security Office] is unable to prove that the cocaine was in fact substituted with flour; however, the [Government of Guinea]‘s lack of cooperation and vehement rejection to a request for random sampling raises troubling questions about the [Government of Guinea]‘s interest in transparency. And as the [US] Ambassador’s driver very keenly observed, “I know the smell of burning marijuana, and I didn’t smell anything.” The entire event was a theatrical production.

Thankfully the US Ambassador’s driver was there to recognize the smell of burning marijuana, or else the seizure may have remained a mystery to this day.

The event was a real eye-opener and a facade. The incineration was a ridiculous attempt by the [Government of Guinea] to prove that a law enforcement campaign against narcotics exists. If anything was proven, it was that the traffickers’ influence has reached the highest levels of the government. There is an obvious fracture within the security forces, and only a handful of officials appear to be fighting to carry out legitimate duties. The clear reluctance and open animosity displayed by all the senior Ministry of Interior and Security (MIS) officials and the diffident response of the Ministers to the [US] Ambassador’s request suggest complicity at the highest levels of the Ministry. The silver-lining of the event is that the heated debate and ridiculous protestation by MIS to the Ambassador’s request for a random sampling were witnessed and recorded by elements of the Guinean media (state-owned and independent).

From Cable Reference ID 08CONAKRY184, 2008-03-06 14:02:00, Classification SECRET, Origin Embassy Conakry.

The Association of Independent Research Chemical Retailers (AIRCR) is a collection of largely UK based research chemical vendors who have banded together in a stated attempt at creating a self-regulating organization. The motivation apparently was a result of the wide-scale scams and misrepresentation of product that occurred as the easy money of mephedrone sales started to dry up due to government regulation.

A noble goal indeed, as even before this the research chemical scene as a whole was not exactly a shining example of professionalism and restraint. Self-regulating organizations have a strong track record in many fields including finance, law, medicine, and engineering, and can demonstrate the ability of the market to regulate itself without requiring explicit government oversight. They can also quickly shift from self-regulating to self-serving organizations as their structures may encourage monopolistic behavior and cronyism.

AIRCR initially appeared to sit almost precisely between these two extremes. There was no question that after the March 2010 ban of mephedrone in the UK many research chemical vendors scrambled to provide any substitute product at all to the seething masses who had gotten used to the cheap and staggeringly effective drug. Hyperpotent long-lasting toxic stimulants, existing (and now illegal) mephedrone stocks rebranded and sold with nonsense chemical formulas, and simply fake product had created mass disillusionment within many retail customers, and retailers began to panic as they saw sales volumes plummet.

The retail strategy of AIRCR seems to be best outlined by the approach of a group of several UK based websites who are now AIRCR members. Their first mainstream exclusive compound 6-APB (“Benzo Fury”) was based off the structure of the classic MDA. Correctly identifying that the major issues leading to prohibition of mephedrone were indiscriminate doses and widely available cheap product, 6-APB was produced in limited runs and pressed into “pellets” (not pills, which would imply human consumption and not “research” of course). Presumably the hope was that with a more expensive product divided up into an appropriate dose overconsumption would be less of an issue. By having a monopoly on production and controlling supply, the compound could be rationed via economic pressures to those most likely to use it correctly – and more importantly, to those least likely to create unwanted media attention. While less profitable month to month than the wide-scale sales of mephedrone, it would hopefully provide a more consistent cash flow, few competitive pressures, and a longer production run leading to a better structured business model.

For new recreational entheogens with limited reinforcing characteristics this business model, while far from perfect, is a rational approach to the current regulatory environment. Retail levels sales to end users are largely tolerated if media attention and underage use is limited, a sort of “don’t ask, don’t tell” of the drug world. But with their latest product, AIRCR has succumbed completely to the temptations of monopoly and have fixed a noose about their own neck.

The compound in question is literally trademarked by AIRCR as methiopropamine, presumably to distract from the more conventional nomenclature of methamthetamine. The similarity to the much-demonized methamphetamine is no coincidence, as it can be thought of as methamphetamine where the phenyl group is replaced by a sulfur-containing thiophene group. Typically the replacement of a phenyl with a thiophene in this class of compounds results in increased inhibition of VMAT, which can be correlated with increased reinforcement and addictive effects. Preliminary tests appear to indicate similar qualitative effects to methamphetamine, a shorter duration, slightly lower potency, and more peripheral effects including vasoconstriction and sweating.

It seems almost a foregone conclusion to say that sales of a research chemical with this level of behavioural reinforcement and close structural similarity to one of the most publicly demonized drugs of our time will not end well. Supply controls will likely be insufficient to limit media attention, and these very supply controls are likely to be quickly circumvented as synthesis and precursors will be vigorously investigated by other labs wanting to get in on a fast buck. A shame that the first public attempt at self-regulation in the research chemical industry could fall to temptation so quickly.

Farewell AIRCR, we hardly knew ye.

Rich Remsburg works as an archival image researcher on documentaries for PBS, National Geographic, the History Channel, museum exhibits and independent films. While working on a documentary on the history of biological warfare he came across a clip detailing US Army research in LSD and its effect on troops marching. Transcript:

US Army Chemical Corps
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland
1958

These film records do not necessarily denote official Army doctrine. They cannot be obtained from the US Signal Corps.

A typical drill seargeant orders his men to fall in. The squad, composed of volunteers for the test, responded like well trained soldiers, immediately and without question. On the drill field the men obeyed his commands accurately and with precision. A second drill seargant assumed command. He put the squad through its paces capably. This man also proved to be an able drill seargant, giving precise commands.

Two hours later, the squad all except the [first] drill seargant are drugged with LSD and again were ordered to fall in. The response was not the same. The squad leader thought it was not necessary for him to dress right. There was much laughter as the group attempted to give expression to inner emotions. This elation was group supported, and an individual who was seperated from the group would show severe disturbance. Notice the volunteer who salutes several times. Five minutes later a severe depression [of the saluting volunteer] convince the medical officers to end his participation in this test.

Response and reaction to the [first] drill seargant who did not receive LSD were as before. But in marching, the drugged squad, although starting fairly well, gave a sluggish and ragged performance. After a few minutes, the men found it difficult to obey orders, and soon, the results were chaotic.

The second drill seargant, who had performed effectively earlier in the day, was now given command of the squad. He too had received LSD and he no longer was an effective leader. When an officer ordered the leader to drill the squad, he responded with “You want a drill? You drill ‘em!”. Ordered to leave the field, he refused to go. In answer to a direct question, he said he was capable of drilling the men and was instructed to do so. Minutes later, it was evident that he was unable to carry out his orders, and he was escorted from the field.

We have seen some of the effects of LSD. What effect would it have on a vital operation? Further research is required to give us that answer.

[cut to a Nike Ajax missile battery readying for launch, typically placed around population centers and strategic locations such as long-range bomber bases, nuclear plants, and ICBM sites in the late 1950s]

A far better explanation for why LSD is currently Schedule I under the UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances than I have heard to date.

A cable was sent in November of 2009 from the US Embassy in Maputo detailing the increasing problems Mozambique was experiencing with drug trafficking. The diplomat described how “porous borders, lack of law enforcement resources, and rampant corruption allow drug traffickers to freely transit the country”.

Air Routes

2. (S) The primary route for cocaine is by air to Maputo from Brazil via Johannesburg, Lisbon or Luanda. On arrival passengers and baggage do not pass through immigration and customs, which allows them to avoid the improved security at the airports of origin. Drugs (mostly cocaine) are smuggled overland to South Africa for local South African consumption or onward to Europe. Cocaine is often smuggled by mules and/or in suitcases with hidden compartments. The drug traffickers routinely bribe Mozambique police, immigration and customs officials in order to get the drugs into the country. The decrease in drug related arrests at Maputo International Airport is not attributable to improved interdiction efforts but rather increased police and customs involvement in drug smuggling. A high level law enforcement official admits most police drug seizures are not reported to his office because traffickers and police make on-the-spot arrangements to allow the drugs to continue to flow. Police and customs officials routinely detain drug smugglers and are then bribed to release the smugglers and the drugs are confiscated and resold. Domingos Tivane, the Director of Customs, is directly involved in facilitating drug shipments. Tivane has amassed a personal fortune in excess of a million dollars, to include numerous investments around Mozambique.

Sea Routes

3. (S) Transport by sea is the preferred route for hashish, mandrax, and heroin shipments, often involving large quantities. Drugs come from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. They are then loaded onto a vessel that sails to Dar Es-Salam, Tanzania, or Mombasa, Kenya. Drugs are often concealed in containers with legitimate goods and are often offloaded and sent via land to Mozambique. Alternatively, the vessel offloads its cargo in the Ports of Maputo, Beira and especially Nacala. Drugs are then smuggled overland to South Africa or onward via air, to the U.S. and Europe.

“Mandrax” here refers to a brand name of methaqualone, commonly known as Quaaludes in North America. No longer legally produced, it is clandestinely manufactured for the illegal drug market in many African and South Asian countries. Methaqualone is a common drug of abuse in low-income segments of South African society, where it is mixed with cannabis (“dagga”) and typically smoked in a bottle neck pipe.

Two Main Drug Trafficking Networks

4. (S) There are two large drug trafficking networks that operate in Mozambique. Both of these networks have ties to South East Asia. Mohamed Bashir Suleiman (MBS) is the head of a well financed organized crime and money laundering network centered on the family owned and managed business conglomerate Grupo MBS. Suleiman uses Grupo MBS and proxies like Rassul Trading, run by Ghulam Rassul, and Niza Group, owned by the Ayoub family, to smuggle drugs from Pakistan via Dubai in containers carrying televisions, electrical equipment, cooking oil and automobiles. The Suleiman family has connections in South Africa, Somalia, Pakistan, Latin America and Portugal, and maintains a complex structure of businesses with a wide variety of commercial activities that serve as a cover for a multitude of illegal activities. Suleiman has a close relationship with former President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano and current President Armando Guebuza, and enjoys ties to senior level Mozambican officials, including the Director of Customs, Tivane. Grupo MBS and the Suleiman family reportedly have connections in the Ibrahim Dawood international drug syndicate.

5. (S) Ghulam Rassul Moti is a Mozambique based ethnic South Asian narcotics trafficker who has smuggled hashish and heroin in the Nampula province of Northern Mozambique since at least 1993. He has been linked to several prominent international narcotics traffickers and uses these relationships and his political influence to avoid customs and police inspections at the seaports and borders. Moti owns Rassul Trading Co. and Grupo ARJ which are major narcotics importers in Nacala, and suspected in the trafficking of persons, mainly Pakistanis. Post is also seeing increased cooperation between West and East African based narcotics networks with Mozambique drug networks. The main drug organizations are rumored to support extremist Islamist elements in Mozambique.

Corruption of Senior Level Government Officials

6. (S) A porous border, lack of resources for law enforcement as well as endemic corruption among Mozambique’s senior level officials leads to a situation where drug traffickers are able to freely transit the country. Mid-level Mozambican officials are afraid to go after people involved in the major drug networks because they know they have connections to senior level government officials. Senior members of the ruling FRELIMO party are seeking to hide the level of corruption from the press, the electorate and the international donor community. As a high level law enforcement official also said recently in private, ‘Some fish are too big to catch.’

From Cable Reference ID 09MAPUTO1291, 2009-11-16 07:07, Classification SECRET, Origin Embassy Maputo.

On November 24, 2010, the DEA used its emergency scheduling authority to temporarily control JWH-018, JWH-073, JWH-200, CP-47,497, and cannabicyclohexanol, synthetic cannabinoids used as cannabis substitutes. If history is any guide, this tempory control will soon become permanent. The major motivations for this action appeared to be twofold. First, use among members of the military had become increasingly prevalent as these compounds produced metabolites that did not flag typical drug tests. Secondly, the high potency and full agonism of certain compounds (particularly JWH-018) could lead to states of anxiety in higher doses. While a temporary mental state and not reflective of any physical toxicity, hospitals began reporting an increase in admissions and emergency calls from primarily inexperienced and younger users in the midst of a wigout. Despite a complete lack of quantifiable mental or physical harm, this led to media demonization as a “dangeous drug available to teens”.

So the DEA intervened, but there’s just one problem. The synthetic cannabinoids emergency scheduled are a tiny fraction of literally thousands of related compounds known to science – with more being discovered every day. So what are some of the cannabinoids currently on the market that slide in under the radar?

JWH-018 (CB1 Ki = 9.00 nM, CB2 Ki = 2.94 nM) The most famous alkylated naphthoylindole, doomed to criminalization in the United States, and included here as a structural reference.
JWH-019 (CB1 Ki = 9.80 nM, CB2 Ki = 5.55 nM) Poor JWH-019. An alkylated naphthoylindole just like its butyl (JWH-073) and pentyl (JWH-018) brothers, they rose to fame while it languished in obscurity. A less anxiety prone and more cerebral headspace combined with a marginal decrease in potency relative to JWH-018 could lead to the last still-legal homologue of the family finally getting its dues.
JWH-081 (CB1 Ki = 1.20 nM, CB2 Ki = 12.4 nM) If we look at the structure of JWH-081, we can see that it is very similar to JWH-018 with the exception of the methoxy group. Unlike JWH-018 however, it is more selective for the CB1 receptor which appears to be correlated with reduced anxiety (like JWH-073). A less trippy headspace with more physical stoning effects, and mild euphoria.
JWH-250 (CB1 Ki = 11 nM, CB2 Ki = 33 nM) Replace the notorious napthalene ring of JWH-018 with a 2′-methoxyphenylacetyl group and you get JWH-250, a rising star. Unlike other synthetic cannabinoids which produce a more indica-style headspace, JWH-250 produces an effect somewhat similar to JWH-018 with a clear, soaring, sativa charactered stone.
RCS-4 (BTM-4, SR-19) (CB1 Ki = ?? nM, CB2 Ki = ?? nM) With a structure reminiscent of JWH-081 if we chopped its napthyl in half to produce a phenyl group, this synthetic cannabinoid has similar potency and effects to JWH-018, all allegedly without legal issues or the infamous JWH “fear”. Interestingly enough this seems to be the result of independent research seeking new psychoactive (and profitable) cannabinoids, and not simply someone pinching from academic journal articles. Prohibition made the production of these cannabinoids a huge cash cow, and now a self-sustaining independent industry with very credible players has been born.
AM-694 (CB1 Ki = 0.08 nM, CB2 Ki = 1.44 nM) A hyperpotent cannabinoid based on CB1 binding affinity, with a fluorine on the end of the pentyl chain in an apparent attempt to increase duration of effect. This raised some eyebrows when it first appeared with concerns about possible metabolism to toxic fluoroacetate. Luckily it appears that the odd-numbered (pentyl) chain means that the less toxic 3-fluoropropanoic acid will likely be produced instead. The choice of this compound for wide distribution rather than other alternatives raises questions, as the emphasis on duration and potency seem to reveal a focus on profit rather than quality of headspace.

This should not be considered anywhere near a complete list of compounds currently available in the marketplace, and is an even tinier slice of the vast number known to produce pleasurable psychoactive effects. It seems unlikely that a blanket approach based on criminalization will be practical, as a large number of related compounds have demonstrated breakthrough benefit in treating afflictions such as Alzheimer’s and cancer. There is simply too much money to be made with these new medicines that would be caught in the net, and legislators are aware of this.

What seems more likely is an uneasy truce between synthetic cannabinoid producers and the DEA based on certain criteria. If the producers are sensible enough to avoid explicit sales to military personnel and teens resulting in decreased media attention, they will likely be ignored. Synthetic cannabinoids preparations sold on a retail level (“herbal incence” products) will likely be seized for “investigation” regardless of the legality of the active ingredient, as inventory tied up in evidence lockers will result in cost pressures almost as effective as an actual ban. Existing distributors are likely to move toward larger scale sale of explicitly unscheduled cannabinoids, allowing greed to motivate new smaller players to move into the now excessive scrutiny of retail level distribution.